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WHAT DID THEY MEAN?: HOW PRINCIPLES OF
GROUP COMMUNICATION CAN INFORM ORIGINAL
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE AND ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE INTENT
W. Matt Morgan*
[W]e do not throw up our hands when considering a group’s com-
munication; rather we attempt to make sense of it using ordinary,
original meanings.1
INTRODUCTION
The judiciary’s proper role under Article III of the United States Constitution2
has been the subject of debate since the promulgation of the Constitution.3 The con-
versation continues notwithstanding the expanse of time. This Note focuses on a sub-
set of interpretative methods: originalism and its analogues to statutory interpretation
(cumulatively referred to herein as original meaning jurisprudence). Within the realm
of original meaning jurisprudence, two divergent trails have been blazed:4 give the
* J.D. Candidate, William and Mary Law School, 2015. Thank you to the William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal for its work on this Article, Professor Peter A. Alces for his helpful in-
sights into researching the Uniform Commercial Code, and my Notes Editor Bradley C. Tobias
for his guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like to extend a special thank you
to Andrew Clack for his thoughtful advice on the need for a repeatable methodology in inter-
pretative methods. His insights very much improved the content of this Note. All errors are
my own.
1 Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
529, 536 (1998).
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
3 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (“The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by
the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”).
4 Placing advocates of original meaning jurisprudence into two camps is certainly an
oversimplification; different theories are inevitably more nuanced. See Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541,
557 n.60 (1994) (“[O]riginalists disagree somewhat amongst themselves on this question,
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legal text its original public meaning,5 or look to the text’s original intended meaning.6
While original meaning jurisprudence covers an array of interpretive methods, they can
all be distilled down to either a form of textualism or intentionalism.7 Professor Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong offers a description of the two: “At the most general level, textu-
alists claim that the meanings of the words in the text should guide interpretation,
whereas intentionalists claim that an author’s intentions should guide interpretation.”8
The terms textualism and intentionalism can be somewhat misleading. Intention-
alism could be easily misunderstood as an inquiry into the lawgiver’s intended goals
or purposes for a law—what the lawgiver hoped to accomplish with the legal text.9
Furthermore, intentionalism, when juxtaposed to textualism, creates an impression that
the intentionalist is not concerned with text. Legal texts are in fact vital to both inter-
pretative methods; the crucial difference between the two concerns whose meaning
attaches to the text. Meaning under textualism is derived from the listener (the public),10
while meaning under intentionalism is derived from the speaker (the lawgiver).11
Textualism has been referred to as the more sophisticated form of interpretation
on more than one occasion,12 and perhaps for good reason. That trail has been trod by
with Raoul Berger advocating a form of extreme intentionalism . . . , while Justice Scalia and
Professor Harrison essentially advocate a form of nearly pure textualism. Former Judge Bork
and Professor McConnell follow a middle course, in our view, between the intentionalist and
textualist extremes.”). But for the purpose of this Note, it is enough to say that some rely more
heavily on public meaning while others focus more on intended meaning.
5 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention. If someone found a letter from
George Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by the power to lay taxes was not
what other people meant, that would not change our reading of the Constitution in the slight-
est. . . . When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words ordinarily mean.”);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997)
(“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”).
6 See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 15–16 (1987) (supporting
proposition that intentions of lawmaking bodies are in fact law, “rising even above the text”).
7 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 465, 465 (2005).
8 Id.
9 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 994–95 (2004)
(discussing difference between intended meanings and intended goals); see also supra Part
I.D. (discussing the distinction between intentionalism and purposivism).
10 See supra note 5.
11 See supra note 6.
12 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1917 (2012) (“[O]riginalism has become more sophisticated. It is
now understood that original meaning, not original intent, is the most appropriate originalist
source of constitutional law.”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism
Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 412 (1998) (“Professor Machen’s article demonstrates
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the heavyweights of original meaning jurisprudence.13 Deriving meaning from the
listener, however, may be inconsistent with basic principles of communication14—
and legal texts are undeniably communicative in nature.15 With so many of original
meaning’s intellectual giants treading the path of original public meaning, one might
suspect that the footpath to original intended meaning will go the way of all unmain-
tained trails, yielding to the overgrowth until no man dare traverse it. However, orig-
inal intended meaning may be seeing a resurgence, with originalist scholar Professor
Sai Prakash lending credibility to the intentionalist cause.16 Prakash’s position is likely
attributable to his understanding that legal texts are communicative in nature.17 And
intended meanings are critical (Professor Prakash might even say indispensible18)
to interpreting communications.19
that he was what modern scholars refer to as a ‘sophisticated’ originalist. He believed the ex-
amination of original meaning is not the search for what the Framers specifically had in mind
when they drafted the text, but rather for the general and reasonable meaning of the language
they used.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism As Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1599, 1609 (1989) (“I do not want to claim that any originalist theory of constitutional inter-
pretation requires contemporary interpreters to recapture the founders’ own understanding of
the Constitution in the same way that romantic hermeneutics does. Indeed, it is quite evident
that sophisticated originalists make no such pretensions.”).
13 Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, both intellectual juggernauts in the
realm of original meaning jurisprudence, are both advocates of textualism. See John F. Manning,
Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (describing Justice Scalia
and Judge Easterbrook as “[t]he leading exponents of modern textualism”).
14 See infra Part II.B.1.
15 See Jan Engberg, Statutory Texts As Instances of Language(s): Consequences and
Limitations on Interpretation, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1135, 1135 (2004) (“My basic assump-
tion, based on results from modern research in cognitively oriented text linguistics, is that legal
texts are perfectly normal texts subject to the characteristics of human communication . . . .”).
16 What is notable about Professor Prakash is not that he is a lone voice in the wilderness
heralding a resurgence of intentionalism—there are certainly other highly distinguished legal
scholars, past and present, who share his view. What makes Professor Prakash an interesting
figure among intentionalists is that he has, at least it seems, arrived at his current position via
a tour as a textualist. Compare Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 552 (“The meaning of
all such legal writings depends on their texts, as they were objectively understood . . . .”),
with Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 969 (“[Intention free] textualism is a conceptual
impossibility.”).
17 See The Federalist Society, Originalism: A Rationalization or Principled Theory? Pt. 2,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JH5TbEyL3a0 (“If you want
to understand what an utterance or document means, you try to understand what the speaker
or author was trying to convey. This is what we do in everyday conversations . . . . [T]his seems
to be a foundation of communication—an attempt to understand what other people are trying
to convey to us.”) (statement by Professor Prakash, 1:55 through 2:13) [hereinafter Federalist
Society Panel on Originalism].
18 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 969 (“[O]ne cannot interpret texts without
reference to the intentions of some author.”).
19 See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 5 (1967) (“To banish the original
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If legal texts are communications, then they are group communications, and to
be sure, group communications pose certain challenges.20 If it is a basic principle of
communication that we attach the speaker’s intended meaning to a communication,21
whose meaning do we attach when it is probable (perhaps even certain) that individ-
ual members within the group have subjectively attached different meanings to the
same words? This presents a major problem when interpreting not only legal texts
but all group communications. On one hand we cannot imagine how a group can at-
tach a single meaning to the words it uses when individuals within that group almost
certainly have attached varied meanings to those words,22 and on the other hand we
are baffled by the thought that a group cannot attach meanings that are peculiar to some
will of the group. The collective intent problem has no absolute solution, but neverthe-
less, we manage to make sense of group communications every day. Original meaning
jurisprudence should embrace principles of group communication when interpreting
legal texts.
The overarching purpose of this Note is to argue that principles of group
communications can guide the original meaning inquiry. Part I argues two points:
(1) law maintains its original meaning, and (2) law has, by nature, a communicative
element. Part II examines the underlying principles of group communications23 that
could inform original meaning jurisprudence. This requires not only an inquiry into
how other fields approach group communications, but also how groups form their
communications, and how listeners interpret group communications. Part III begins
with a discussion of how group communications can inform inquiries into a law’s
original meaning, and ends with an application of those principles to a body of law
that is particularly interesting for this inquiry—the Uniform Commercial Code.
author as the determiner of meaning was to reject the only compelling normative principle that
could lend validity to an interpretation.”).
20 See infra Part II.A (discussing problem of collective intent).
21 See BERGER, supra note 6, at 17 (“That is the essence of communication; it begins with
the speaker who alone is entitled to say what he meant. No listener or reader may insist in the
teeth of the speaker’s own explanation that he meant exactly the opposite.”); Federalist Society
Panel on Originalism, supra note 17 (“[T]his seems to be a foundation of communication—an
attempt to understand what other people are trying to convey to us.”) (statement by Professor
Prakash, 1:55 through 2:13).
22 This lack of collective intent among individual lawmakers has been the chief criticism of
intentionalism. See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
23 This Note focuses on five principles of communication germane to the original meaning
calculus: (1) meaning is set by the speaker, see supra Part II.B.1; (2) while groups cannot form
intents, attributing a metaphorical intent to groups is useful for determining the meaning of
group communications, see supra Part II.B.2; (3) we can derive metaphorical intent through
simple and complex summative accounts of group communications, see supra Part II.B.3;
(4) individuals within the group often form their intent by relying on the expertise and intended
meanings of others in the group, see supra Part II.B.4; and (5) for practical reasons, listeners
often do resort to public meaning to make sense of group communications when metaphor-
ical intent is too difficult to ascertain, see supra Part II.B.5.
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I. DISTINGUISHING AUTHORIAL MEANING FROM THE INTERPRETER’S MEANING
Before proceeding, it may be worthwhile to address why we should treat legal
texts as conveying a set meaning. In the field of literary critique, this idea has met
a great deal of resistance.24 But in virtually every other aspect of life we understand
that communications convey an authorial meaning that exists independent of our
interpretation. If a mountaineer misreads his topographic map, a new mountain does
not sprout up under his feet to match the location of his faulty interpretation. Maps
are communications, communicating an external reality already in existence. Inter-
pretation, of course, has no power to change what already exists; misinterpreting legal
texts (innocently or intentionally) can no more change the underlying law than mis-
reading a topographic map can move mountains. This is not to argue that faulty inter-
pretations cannot change our perception of what a law is. Indeed, we may follow faulty
legal interpretations just as we may all calibrate our altimeters to match the mountain-
eer’s faulty interpretation of the map. What is argued is that law exists distinct from
the interpreter’s understanding of it and endures despite interpretive methods that
miss their mark.
Law in its broadest sense can perhaps be seen as consisting of two elements: a
sort of existential element (what comes into existence by virtue of the lawmaking
process), and a communicative element (the text that communicates to us what the
existential element is). Because the communicative element only serves to tell us the
location of the existential element, the basis for interpretation should be to use the
communicative element to reveal the station of the existential element.
A. The Existential Element
When laws are ratified, something comes into existence, albeit not in a physical
form. Law is perhaps metaphysical: a series of invisible lines that once crossed create
liability. If this existential element is brought into existence by virtue of the lawmak-
ing process, then the goal of judicial interpretation should be to determine where the
lines have been drawn.25 True interpretation can consist of nothing else,26 and faulty
24 E.D. Hirsch details some of the popular objections to interpretations that rely on authorial
intent: “The meaning of a text changes—even for the author ;” “It does not matter what an au-
thor means—only what his text says ;” “The author’s meaning is inaccessible ;” “The author
often does not know what he means.” HIRSCH, supra note 19, at 6–23.
25 Or at least arrive at conclusions that are as close to the lines as possible. In many
circumstances it is impossible to perfectly discern original meanings, but that should not dis-
courage judges from getting as close as possible. See BORK, supra note 5, at 163 (“We must not
expect too much of the search for original understanding in any legal context. The result of the
search is never perfection; it is simply the best we can do; and the best we can do must be re-
garded as good enough—or we must abandon the enterprise of law and, most especially, that of
judicial review.”); Prakash, supra note 1, at 535 (“Originalism simply does not rest on a theory
of definite meanings; it only requires an ability to determine which of several possible meanings
better reflects the most natural reading of the word or phrase when the text was ratified.”).
26 If judges have the power to move the lines by virtue of nothing more than their own
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interpretations have no power to move lines drawn by a process completely inde-
pendent to the interpretative process.
B. The Communicative Element
Lewis Carroll offered an illustration that goes to the heart of the meaning of words:
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you
don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument
for you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’”
Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scorn-
ful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more
nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be
master—that’s all.”27
Communications carry the baggage of the speaker’s intended meaning.28 A listener
misconstruing the speaker’s words has no power to change what the speaker in fact
intended the words to mean.29
interpretation of legal texts, then the lawmaking process is for naught. Cf. Prakash, supra
note 1, at 530–31 (“[A]bsent originalism we must question why we would bother to recognize
an institution as a lawmaker and its words as law if we simultaneously reserve the right to con-
strue the law’s words without regard to their original meanings. Put simply, without original-
ism we have to believe that lawmakers codify words but not meaning and we have to suppose
that we sensibly can recognize some set of words as law, but supply our own meaning.”).
27 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 81
(1871).
28 See HIRSCH, supra note 19, at 5 (“To banish the original author as the determiner of
meaning was to reject the only compelling normative principle that could lend validity to an
interpretation.”). Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner, however, would take issue:
To say that words have no meaning, indeed no existence, apart from the
intention of their author is a ludicrous extension of the thesis that a tree
falling in a deserted forest makes no noise. King Lear would still be King
Lear if it were produced by the random typing of a thousand monkeys
over a thousand years.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING THE LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 25 (2012). This Note does not take the position that every word or phrase should be ap-
proached as a blank slate that can only be filled in by the communicator’s intended meaning. The
information costs involved would be insurmountable. It is worth noting, however, that if the
Court of King’s Bench had relied on a typing ape to provide a rule for policing unfair contracts, 
and by some miracle the monkey managed to hammer out the words “the unconscionability
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Law does not reside in legal texts; words themselves are not the source of legal
liability. Legal texts do, however, communicate to us what the existential element
is—the metaphysical lines drawn by the lawmaking process that are the source of
legal liability. If it is controversial to say that law does not reside in legal texts, it is
certainly more agreeable to say that legal texts are communications.30 However, if
legal texts are communications, then they are group communications, which cer-
tainly pose problems for listeners who must look to several individuals within the
group to determine an authorial intent.31
C. The Lines Are Drawn by Intended Meaning
It is of course one thing to say that law’s existential element consists of meta-
physical lines that once crossed create liability, and another to say that the location
of the lines are delineated by a legislature’s intended meaning. There may in fact be
good reason to believe that the original public meaning of the text sets the lines;32 but
as will be discussed throughout this Note, principles of communication suggest that
words (including legal texts) carry the baggage of the speaker’s intended meaning.33
And if law is in fact communicative in nature, intended meanings are indispensable.34
Professor Raoul Berger, an early proponent of modern original meaning jurispru-
dence, supported the proposition that the intentions of lawmaking bodies are in fact the
doctrine,” years before the phrase was ever conceived, the words would be random symbols,
and a judge would be hard-pressed to find a way to use those symbols in any useful way. See
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 976.
29 See supra note 6, at 17.
30 See Engberg, supra note 15, at 1135 (“My basic assumption, based on results from modern
research in cognitively oriented text linguistics, is that legal texts are perfectly normal texts sub-
ject to the characteristics of human communication . . . .”); see also The Federalist Society,
Judicial Philosophy/Originalism—The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwhpfjVqXXs (“I think
one of the reasons why originalism has such staying power . . . is [ ] because it just coheres to
people’s common sense understanding of interpretation . . . . If they have . . . a diary from their
grandmother, they are not going to be applying some highfalutin theory about interpretation, they
are going to try to figure out what their grandmother was trying to convey in the diary . . . .”)
(statement by Professor Saikrishna Prakash, 1:03:33 through 1:04:20) [hereinafter Federalist
Society Panel on Robert Bork].
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 This Note is sympathetic to this position. There may just be something different about
law that lends itself to original public meaning. Perhaps people should not be bound by an autho-
rial intent that is not readily discernable in the legal text. See BORK, supra note 5, at 144 (“Law
is a public act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing.”); SCALIA, supra note 5,
at 17 (“[T]he reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply incompatible
with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a
law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”).
33 See infra Part II.B.1.
34 See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9 (arguing that intention-free textualism
is impossible).
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law, “rising even above the text.”35 In expounding his position, Professor Berger cites
James Madison,36 Justice Story,37 Justice Holmes,38 Justice Wilson,39 and Hawaii v.
Mankichi.40 Professor Berger’s position is driven by principles of communication:
“That is the essence of communication; it begins with the speaker who alone is entitled
to say what he meant. No listener or reader may insist in the teeth of the speaker’s own
explanation that he meant exactly the opposite.”41
Principles of communication are not the sole reason to believe that the existential
element of law is formed by the lawmaking body’s intended meaning. Intended mean-
ings are manifestations of the law making body’s judgment—and the precise reason
for selecting individuals to comprise a lawmaking body is because we believe that
they will exercise their judgment in addressing very specific issues. To deprive a law-
making body of its intended meaning frustrates the very purpose of electing particular
individuals to serve in the lawmaking body.42
More often than not, a lawmaking body’s intended meaning will be coincident
with public meaning.43 Even textualists who focus exclusively on public meaning
35 BERGER, supra note 6, at 15–16.
36 James Madison wrote in a letter to Andrew Stevenson:
I cannot but highly approve the industry with which you have searched
for a key to the sense of the Constitution, where alone the true one can be
found; in the proceedings of the Convention, the contemporary exposi-
tions, and above all in the ratifying Conventions of the States. If the in-
strument be interpreted by criticisms which lose sight of the intention
of the parties to it, in the fascinating pursuit of objects of public advan-
tage or conveniency, the purest motives can be no security against inno-
vations materially changing the features of the Government.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 474 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(emphasis added).
37 See JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 400 at 283 (1851) (“The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments
is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties.”)
(emphasis added).
38 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 206 (1920) (“Of course,
the purpose of written instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of those who
write them, and it is desirable to make that purpose effectual . . . .”).
39 1 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 14 (1804), reprinted in 1
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 438 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007)
(“The first and governing maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning
of those, who made it.”).
40 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (“‘The intention of the lawmaker is the law’” (quoting Smythe
v. Fiske, 90 U.S. 374, 380 (1874))).
41 BERGER, supra note 6, at 17.
42 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43 Speakers tend to communicate in a way that is understandable to their target audiences.
See Robert M. Krauss & Susan R. Fussell, Perspective-Taking in Communication: Represen-
tations of Others’ Knowledge in Reference, 9 SOC. COGNITION 2, 3 (1991) (“Messages are
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will look to statements of individuals within the lawmaking body as a representation
of the public meaning.44 When the intended meaning differs from the public meaning,
it is likely the result of poor draftsmanship,45 and it would be a dubious proposition that
any lawmaker has ever been elected to office on a campaign of “I write with clarity.”
Voters certainly care about lawmakers’ substance more than their writing style.
Reliance on public meaning unquestionably has its benefits, ensuring that the
meaning of the text is available to those who must follow the law.46 After all, “[l]aw
is a public act.”47 However, to allow public meaning to win out over a clearly contra-
dictory intended meaning is inconsistent with the purpose of setting up lawmaking
bodies, and inconsistent with basic principles of communication.
D. A Word About Purposivism
Intentionalism and purposivism are often lumped together in criticisms of
legislative intent, but the interpretive methods are distinguishable: intentionalism looks
to a lawmaking body’s intended meaning of a text,48 while purposivism looks to a law-
making body’s intended purposes or goals—what the lawgiver wants to accomplish
formulated to be understood by a specific audience, and in order to be comprehensible they must
take into account what that audience does and does not know.”). Professor Prakash discusses
the practical similarities between intended meaning and public meaning:
It seems to me that the disagreements between original intent folks and
original meaning folks is more theoretical than practical . . . . Practically
speaking, it’s not a meaningful distinction . . . . An original intent person
is likely to think that the original public meaning is what they intended.
Federalist Society Panel on Robert Bork, supra note 30 (statement by Professor Saikrishna
Prakash, 1:22:40 through 1:22:50).
44 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48
STAN. L. REV. 155, 162 n.37 (1995) (“Although I attach no weight to secret legislative histories
or to post-enactment legislative histories of the word ‘Officer’ as it is used in the Presidential
Succession Clause, the fact that [James Madison] thought that the word had the original mean-
ing the Amars attribute to it helps to bolster the plausibility of their argument that most legally
trained readers in 1787 would agree with the Amars’ construction, if asked.”). If the search is
for public meaning, it is curious that a textualist would ever focus on a Framer’s intended mean-
ing. It seems to skew the survey. Were there not hundreds (thousands?) of “legally trained
readers” in 1787 that could proffer a meaning for the word “Officer,” or was James Madison
simply stumbled upon during a vast survey of the entire public? Roll the dice again and you
might land on an obscure barrister from Liverpool.
45 Professors Alexander and Prakash note that even textualists take “scrivener’s error” into
account when interpreting texts. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 979–80.
46 One of Justice Scalia’s criticisms of intentionalism is that the lawgiver’s subjective
meaning may be unavailable to those who must follow the law. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at
17 (“That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in:
posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.”).
47 BORK, supra note 5, at 144.
48 See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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with the law.49 Purposivism is particularly susceptible to judicial activism. Justice
Scalia and Bryan Garner explain:
The most destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism
is its manipulability. Any provision of law . . . can be said to have
a number of purposes, which can be placed on a ladder of abstrac-
tion. A law against pickpocketing, for example, has as its narrowest
purpose the prevention of theft from the person; and then in as-
cending order of generality, the protection of private property; the
preservation of a system of private ownership; the encouragement
of productive activity by enabling producers to enjoy the fruits of
their labor; and, finally, the furtherance of the common good.50
By ascending “the ladder of abstraction,” the interpreter can essentially rewrite legal
texts by making them conform to a general goal of the lawgiver. The higher the inter-
preter climbs up “the ladder of abstraction,” the more freedom she has to rewrite the
text.51 intentionalism on the other hand is not concerned with what the ultimate goal
of a law against pickpocketing is, only what the lawmaking body intended the legal
text to mean.52 For example, what did the lawgiver intend the word “pickpocketing”
to mean? Did the lawgiver intend “pickpocketing” to encompass the thief’s act of
keeping a wallet that has fallen out of a pocket by its own devices? The intentionalist
does not rely on something as abstract and malleable as the “spirit” of the law.53 Like
textualism, intentionalism relies on the letter of the law, the only departure regards
whose meaning attaches to the letter—the speaker’s (the lawgiver) or the listener’s
49 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 70 (2006) (“Purposivists traditionally argued that because Congress passes statutes
to achieve some aim, federal judges should enforce the spirit rather than the letter of the law
when the two conflict.”).
50 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 18–19; see also JOHNATHAN O’NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 (2005) (“Any
interpretation conceived as the application of a specific philosophical or moral theory is
typically rejected.”).
51 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 18–19.
52 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 995 (“The intentionalist does not advocate
ascending up the ladder of generality of intention, at the pinnacle of which all laws turn out to
be the Spike Lee law: do the right thing. He only advocates honoring the intent of the law-
maker at the specific level of generality that the lawmaker meant to convey, even if at that level
it thwarts the lawmaker’s more general intentions.”).
53 Professor John Manning disagrees, contending that intentionalists do in fact rely on the
“spirit” of the law. See Manning, supra note 13, at 429 (“[I]ntentionalists insist that judges
enforce the spirit rather than the letter of the law . . . .”). Perhaps some intentionalists do
appeal to the law’s spirit. Conjuring spirits, however, seems more the work of purposivists
than intentionalists.
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(the public). In this sense, intentionalism is much more consistent with textualism
than purposivism.
The distinction between intentionalism and purposivism is important because
if we say that a lawmaking body’s intended meanings form law’s existential element,
why not say that their intended desires and goals form the same? The reason is that
intended desires and goals are not law;54 they are simply what a lawmaking body
hopes to accomplish with a law. A law’s purpose or goal may in fact be frustrated by
its own meaning. Consider Professor Thomas Sowell’s example:
Ironically, cities with strong rent control laws, such as New York
and San Francisco, tend to end up with higher average rents than
cities without rent control. Where such laws apply only to rents
below some specified level, presumably to protect the poor, build-
ers then have incentives to build only apartments luxurious enough
to be above the rent-control level. Rich and poor alike who move
into the city after rent control has created a housing shortage typ-
ically cannot find a rent-controlled apartment, and so have avail-
able only housing that costs more than it would in a free market,
because of the housing shortage.55
The purposivist climbing “the ladder of abstraction” might invalidate the price ceil-
ings if it would ultimately effectuate the goal or desire of the legislator to “protect
the poor” or “make available affordable housing.” But the intentionalist would only
be concerned with the meaning that the lawmaking body attached to the text—there
would be no route to invalidation of the price ceiling.
E. The Existential Element, The Communicative Element, and
Group Communications
When Humpty Dumpty said “glory,” the word meant “there’s a nice knock-down
argument for you.”56 It did not matter that Alice perceived the word “glory” to mean
something different, because the speaker did not intend the word to mean anything
but “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you.” When a lawmaking body pro-
mulgates a legal text, however, it is not merely a conversation between two people, it
is a group communication—several individuals using one set of words to convey
one meaning. Individuals within the group likely will subjectively attach different
54 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2009) (“The set of rules or
principles dealing with a specific area of a legal system . . . .”) (definition of “law”); see also
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 994 (“[T]he goals [legal texts] are meant to achieve are
not the same thing as the meanings they are intended to convey.”).
55 THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS 30 (2004).
56 CARROLL, supra note 27, at 81.
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meanings to the same set of words. This is of course problematic when arguing that
law’s existential element is formed by the lawmaking body’s intended meaning. In
an ideal world, the judge would have universal access to the intended meanings of
each and every member within the lawmaking body, and could analyze them to deter-
mine whether a threshold57 of mutual assent was reached to transform a particular
word or phrase of legal text into law. However, it is unquestionable that the information
costs involved in such an inquiry would be insurmountable. Therefore, any interpretive
enterprise must acknowledge that the goal is not perfection—it is only to interpret
law’s communicative element to get as close to law’s existential element as possible.58
As will be discussed in the following Part, principles of group communications sug-
gest that we should look to the intended meaning of legal texts only under specific
scenarios where intent is more readily discernable, and defer to public meaning in
all other circumstances.59
II. GROUP COMMUNICATIONS
The purpose of this Note is to show how principles of group communication can
inform original meaning jurisprudence. But as mentioned before, group commu-
nications pose certain challenges. When group communications occur, a group of
individuals convey one set of words that have, presumably, one meaning.60 However,
it is likely (perhaps certain, even) that individuals within the group will each subjec-
tively attach different meanings to the same set of words—there is no collective intent
that can be attributed to the group.61
This Part will first discuss the problems associated with group communications and
how those problems have been used to undermine intentionalism.62 Next, this Part will
detail five principles of group communications that could influence the original mean-
ing calculus:63 (1) meaning is set by the speaker;64 (2) while groups cannot form intents,
attributing a metaphorical intent to groups is useful for determining the meaning of
57 The judge might conclude that if a majority of the voting senators attached meaning X
to the word or phrase, then meaning X is the intended meaning of the Senate. Such an inquiry,
however, would be futile because the information needed to answer that question is unattain-
able. See infra Part II.B.4 (arguing that because of the futility of determining the intended
meanings of each individual member, the interpreter should focus only on certain key figures
within the group).
58 See supra note 25.
59 See infra Part II.C.
60 That one meaning is the product of communications may be especially true with legal texts
where we ask the Supreme Court to ultimately resolve contradictory interpretations amongst
lower courts.
61 See infra Part II.A.
62 Infra Part II.A.
63 Infra Part II.B.
64 Infra Part II.B.1.
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group communications;65 (3) we can derive metaphorical intent through simple and
complex summative accounts of group speech;66 (4) individuals within the group often
form their intent by relying on the expertise and intended meanings of others in the
group;67 and (5) for practical reasons, listeners often do resort to public meaning to
make sense of group communications when metaphorical intent is too difficult to
ascertain.68 Finally, this Part will offer a way that group communications can inform
original meaning jurisprudence by relying on both public and intended meaning.69
A. The Problem of Collective Intent
Group communications can be somewhat baffling. One of the biggest criticisms
of intentionalism is that no collective intent can be attributed to groups made up of
individuals who likely all subjectively attached different meanings to the same set of
words.70 Judge Frank Easterbrook (Professor Easterbrook at the time) summed up
the problem of collective intent as follows: “Because legislatures comprise many mem-
bers, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable. Each member
may or may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes.”71
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner add:
[C]ollective intent is pure fiction because dozens if not hundreds
of legislators have their own subjective views on the minutiae of
bills they are voting on—or perhaps no views at all because they
are wholly unaware of the minutiae. The Whigs disagree with the
Tories on how a court will someday apply a given provision—or
they would disagree if they took the time to consider it. . . . Each
member voting for the bill has a slightly different reason for
doing so. There is no single set of intentions shared by all. The
state of the assembly’s collective psychology is a hopeless stew
of intentions . . . .72
The only thing more baffling than group communications themselves, is the notion
that a group cannot attach meanings to its words that depart from the public’s under-
standing.
65 Infra Part II.B.2.
66 Infra Part II.B.3.
67 Infra Part II.B.4.
68 Infra Part II.B.5.
69 Infra Part II.C.
70 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 392; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998).
71 Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 547.
72 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 392.
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Textualists make much of the intentionalist’s problem of collective intent, but
the textualist faces a nearly identical problem. In relying on the public understanding
of a word or phrase, they fail to acknowledge that there can be no collective under-
standing. Members of the public certainly disagree about the meaning of legal texts.
The textualist tries to overcome this problem by resorting to a reasonableness
standard,73 but the problem persists where either equally reasonable members of the
public disagree over an ambiguous word or phrase, or an idealized member of the pub-
lic would conclude that the text has equally plausible alternative meanings.74 If the
textualist is undeterred by the problem of collective understanding—as well he should
be—then the intentionalist should not throw his hands in the air over the problem
of collective intent.
B. Principles of Group Communications
Surveying the literature regarding group communications, and relying on everyday
experiences, it becomes clear that groups can communicate an intended meaning ef-
fectively despite the textualist’s insistence that collective intention poses an insur-
mountable hurdle. If we manage to make sense of group communications in our every-
day lives, it stands to reason that the judge need not throw his hands in the air when
interpreting what is just another form of group communication—legal texts. If the
basis for judicial interpretation is to reveal law’s existential element—the metaphysi-
cal lines that are drawn by virtue of the lawmaking process75—original meaning
jurists should embrace principles of communication when those principles will allow
the judge to better home in on law’s existential element. Admittedly, the search for
intended meaning often will be a quixotic venture, and in those cases textualists will
be vindicated in their reliance on public meaning. However, when we can make the
calculus work, when we can attribute an intended meaning to a lawmaking body,
then we will have come closest to discovering the existential element of law.
1. Meaning is Set by the Speaker
“Bypassing occurs when people miss each other with their meanings. They use
the same words but attribute different meanings to them.”76 The article Bypassing
in Managerial Communications gives an example of the problems that can arise as
73 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”).
74 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 9, at 988 (“[T]he idealized reader whom the
textualist stipulates . . . may conclude that a text has two or more meanings that are equally
supported by the evidence to which he is restricted.”).
75 See supra Part I.A–C.
76 Jerry Sullivan et al., Bypassing in Managerial Communication, 34 BUS. HORIZONS 71,
72 (1991).
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a result of bypassing.77 A Japanese parent company sends a telex to its subsidiary in
America: “SHIP ANY JOB LOTS OF MORE THAN 25 UNITS TO US AT ONCE.”78
An employee with the American subsidiary interprets the words “more than 25 units”
as most Americans would, twenty-six or more, and promptly ships the three lots that
meet that requirement.79 Six weeks later the American subsidiary receives a follow-
up telex from Japan: “WHY DIDN’T YOU DO WHAT WE TOLD YOU? YOUR
QUARTERLY INVENTORY REPORT INDICATES YOU ARE CARRYING 40
LOTS WHICH YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO SHIP TO JAPAN.”80 The author ex-
plains the apparent discrepancy between the parent company’s communication and
the employee’s interpretation: “[I]n Japan ‘more than X’ very often includes X.”81 The
parent company intended “more than twenty-five” to mean twenty-five or more.
This scenario is perhaps what George Bernard Shaw was referencing when he
said, “[t]he single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken
place.”82 What is clear from the above example is that the parties have each subjec-
tively attached different meanings to the same set of words. But whose meaning is
the actual meaning? Principles of communication resolve the question: meaning is
determined by the speaker, not the listener.83
To say that meaning is determined by the speaker is not to argue that in ordinary
conversations we do not occasionally approach the interpretive calculus from an ego-
centric perspective. One study, detailed in Taking Perspective in Conversation: The
Role of Mutual Knowledge in Comprehension, clearly demonstrates that we have a nat-
ural tendency to do so.84 Test subjects assumed the roles of “director” and “addressee.”85
77 Id. at 71–72.
78 Id. at 71.
79 Id. at 71–72.
80 Id. at 71.
81 Id. at 72.
82 See KEY ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 235 (Dennis Tourish & Owen
Hargie eds., 2004) (quoting George Bernard Shaw).
83 See BERGER, supra note 6, at 17 (“That is the essence of communication; it begins with
the speaker who alone is entitled to say what he meant. No listener or reader may insist in the
teeth of the speaker’s own explanation that he meant exactly the opposite.”); HIRSCH, supra
note 19, at 5 (“[W]hen critics deliberately banished the original author, they themselves usurped
his place, and this led unerringly to some of our present-day theoretical confusions. Where
before there had been but one author, there now arose a multiplicity of them, each carrying as
much authority as the next. To banish the original author as the determiner of meaning was to
reject the only compelling normative principle that could lend validity to an interpretation.”);
Federalist Society Panel on Originalism, supra note 17 (“[T]his seems to be a foundation of
communication—an attempt to understand what other people are trying to convey to us.”)
(statement by Professor Prakash, 1:55 through 2:13).
84 Boaz Keysar et al., Taking Perspective in Conversation: The Role of Mutual Knowledge
in Comprehension, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 32, 32 (2000) (noting that listeners occasionally use an
egocentric strategy—considering information that is available to them, but not to the speaker).
85 Id. at 32–33.
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Director and addressee sat on opposite sides of slotted shelves with various items
placed in the slots.86 From addressee’s perspective, every item in the shelf could be
seen; however, from the director’s perspective certain slots were covered, blocking
the contained item from director’s view.87 The addressee could see which items were
blocked from the director’s view.88 Among various items on the shelf were three can-
dles (large, medium, and small).89 All three candles were visible to the addressee, how-
ever the smallest candle was blocked from the director’s perspective.90
During the study, the director was told to instruct the addressee to move “the small
candle” to a different shelf.91 Recall, because the small candle was blocked from di-
rector’s perspective, the medium candle was the small candle as far as the director was
concerned. Despite the addressee’s knowledge that the director was not even aware
of the smallest candle on the shelf, the addressee still considered moving it.92 In six
percent of cases, the addressee reached for the occluded candle but corrected the
faulty interpretation.93 However, in seventeen percent of cases, the addressee moved
the smallest candle despite knowing that the candle was hidden from director’s
perspective.94 While a notable percentage actually moved objects that the director
could not have possibly intended, the overwhelming majority of addressees95 were
seeking the director’s intended meaning, even if it meant overcoming a tendency to
approach the interpretative calculus from an egocentric perspective.96
2. Attributing a Metaphorical Intent to Groups Is Useful for Determining the
Meaning of Group Communications
It is a common theme among textualists to claim that the intentionalist—seeking
the intent of the legislature—is bestowing anthropomorphic characteristics upon the
lawmaking body.97 While this Note frequently uses the word “intent” in the context





91 Id. at 34.
92 The study examined recorded eye movement and fixation to determine whether addressee
considered moving the occluded candle. Id. at 33–34.
93 Id. at 35.
94 Id.
95 Only seventeen percent ultimately move the hidden candle. The rest either corrected their
initial interpretive mistake or followed the director’s intended meaning without reaching for
the hidden candle. Id. at 35.
96 The authors suggest that the tendency to make egocentric interpretations may be the result
of a cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 37 (“[T]here is reason to believe that the likelihood of an
error due to egocentric interpretation is not very high.”).
97 See Kozinski, supra note 70, at 813 (“[T]o look for congressional intent is to engage in
anthropomorphism—to search for something that cannot be found because it does not exist.”);
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of group communications, it is unquestionable that groups do not have the capacity
to form intents.98 Intent can only exist within the individual human mind, and there
is no collective group mind.99 What is meant in this Note by “intent” (and hopefully
what is meant by other intentionalists) is a sort of metaphorical intent. To say that a
group intends something, is not to anthropomorphize the group, but rather to acknowl-
edge that groups can, and do, form something that sure looks a lot like intent, even
if intent itself is an impossibility.100
Attributing a metaphorical intent to groups is commonplace,101 and for good
reason. It allows us to make sense of group actions.102 Judges need not look far for ex-
amples of metaphorical intent—it is routinely the subject of contract law. The com-
mon law of contract requires “mutual assent” for contract formation.103 The Uniform
Commercial Code allows contract formation when “the parties have intended to make
a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”104
If the textualist’s position is taken to its extreme, groups would never be able to enter
contracts under the common law unless a single-actor-agent entered into the contract
on behalf of the group. And their ability to do so under the Uniform Commercial Code
Manning, supra note 13, at 423 (“What characterizes classical intentionalism is its tendency
to anthropomorphize the legislature.”).
98 See Deborah Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/coll-int/ (“A common response to the questions that arise
concerning our practice of ascribing intentional states to groups is to say that these ascriptions
are mere fictions.”) (last visited May 1, 2015).
99 See id. (“The dominant picture in [Anglo-American and European philosophical] circles
is that intentionality is a feature of individual minds/brains.”).
100 And at any rate, even if it is anthropomorphism to ascribe intents to a lawmaking body,
then the anthropomorphic leap is more of a hop. After all, legislatures do happen to be com-
prised entirely of “anthropos.”
101 Even textualists take part. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:
MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 110 (1996) (“[T]he Supreme Court demon-
strated . . . the direction in which they intend to drive the country . . . .” (emphasis added));
id. at 116 (“The framers almost certainly did not intend that the exceptions power be used to
control the Supreme Court.” (emphasis added)); id. at 197 (“[T]o make the roles of men and
women identical are what the feminists intend.” (emphasis added)).
102 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 65–66 (2006) (“The only real solution . . . to the problem of collective inten-
tions is to take the metaphor seriously as a metaphor. The metaphor works by positing the
collective as a fictitious individual. . . . Anthropomorphism of this kind is especially plausible,
and especially necessary, with respect to legal documents, which only function well when they
speak with one voice, even if the process which generated that voice was messy and divisive.”);
see also Tollefsen, supra note 98 (“[O]ur ascriptions of intentional states to groups have a sur-
prising explanatory power. They allow us to predict and explain the actions of groups.”).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (“[T]he formation of a con-
tract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration.”).
104 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2013) (emphasis added).
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would be limited.105 Partnership agreements would also be problematic. Consider a
partnership contract signed by thirty partners. If the textualist approached partnership
agreements as just a “hopeless stew of intentions,” every partnership contract would
become nothing more than thirty ships passing each other in the night. The problem
persists with contract interpretation, where the goal is to determine the intent of the
parties.106 If we could not attribute a metaphorical intent to groups, contract doctrine
would wilt in the presence of corporate contracts.
3. We Can Derive Metaphorical Intent Through Simple and Complex Summative
Accounts of Group Communications
Summative accounts of collective intentionality are majoritarian in the sense that
a majority of mutual intent is necessary in order to ascribe a collective intent to the
group.107 There are two versions of the summative account, both helpful for informing
the intentionalist. The simple summative account holds that if a majority of individ-
uals within the group intends something, then the group intends the same. In other
words, Group A intends X if and only if most of Group A’s members intends X.108
The complex summative account adds a caveat to the simple summative account: it
must be common knowledge within the group that most of its members mean X.109
To summarize, Group A intends X if and only if most of Group A’s members intend
X, and it is common knowledge that most of the members intend X.110
As will be discussed in the following Parts, the simple and complex summative
accounts, on their own, are not useful for the interpretive calculus. While they explain
how we can attribute metaphorical intents to groups, the information costs of discern-
ing the intended meanings of each group member is impossibly high. For purposes
of this Part, it is enough to say that either the simple or complex summative account
is a plausible explanation of group intention, and the following Part will discuss the
shortcuts we take to estimate the summative account without an intensive inquiry
into the mind of each group member. Relating the summative accounts to legal texts,
the simple summative account would factor in privately-held intended meanings of
legislators—for example, a letter written to a colleague about the intended meaning
105 Under the U.C.C., groups could still enter a contract by exhibiting “conduct . . . which
recognizes the existence” of a contract. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2013). Even still, if you believe
that it is anthropomorphism to say that a group can intend something, it is likely anthropomor-
phism to say that a group can “recognize the existence” of something.
106 See In re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. 51, 74 (1865) (“All contracts are to be construed
to accomplish the intention of the parties . . . .”).
107 Tollefsen, supra note 98.
108 See id. (Tollefsen presents the formula in a slightly different manner: “Group G believes
that p if and only if all or most of the members believe that p.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. (Tollefsen’s formulation: “A group G believes that p if and only if (1) most of the
members of G believe that p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1).”).
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of what the text meant.111 For the complex summative account, the intended meaning
would have to be available to the entire lawmaking body—for example, an official
comments section that explains the intended meaning of the text.112
4. Individuals Within the Group Often Form Their Intent by Deferring to the
Intended Meanings of Key Figures in the Group
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner contend that “collective intent is pure fiction
. . . . The state of the assembly’s collective psychology is a hopeless stew of inten-
tions . . . .”113 If lack of collective intent is a pitfall embedded in group communica-
tions, it is no less true that we manage to traverse around it every day unscathed.114 We
interpret group communications constantly without wringing our hands over a “stew
of intentions.” If the Campbell’s Soup Company instructs customers to “[h]eat gently
over medium heat in saucepan, stirring occasionally,”115 most customers manage to
make sense of the group communication without a deeper inquiry into the “collective
psychology” of the corporation. However, if questions did arise over the meaning
of “gently,” “medium heat,” or “occasionally,” both public meaning and intended
meaning likely would resolve the issue to an extent. But is there any question that
the meaning intended116 by Campbell’s would get us closer to the actual meaning?
Nor would we be concerned whether each member of the group—from CEO to deliv-
ery driver—had subjectively attached the same meaning to the words “medium heat.”
This is because we understand that individuals within the group defer to the expertise
and intended meanings of certain key figures within the group when forming their
communications—the CEO and delivery drivers likely have deferred to the expertise
of company chefs. If the company chef was the key figure in forming the communi-
cation and others within the company had deferred to the chef’s intended meaning,
the company chef’s intended meaning would get us closest to the actual meaning of
the text.
Throughout this discussion the key figure in forming the group communication—
to whose intended meanings other group members would be likely to defer—will be
referred to in shorthand as ?. ? represents one key figure within the group. Multiple
?s, however, can exist simultaneously within the group, and each possesses different
111 The simple summative account would allow for evidence of privately held intents because
the simple account does not require that the majority’s intent be common knowledge to group
members. See id.
112 The complex summative account requires that the intended meaning of the majority be
common knowledge to the group. Privately held intents, unknown to the rest of the group, would
not be useful for the complex account.
113 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 392.
114 See Prakash, supra note 1, at 536.
115 Campbell’s® Slow Kettle® Heating Instructions, CAMPBELLSOUP.COM, http://www
.campbellsoup.com/Products/Slow-Kettle/Heating-Instructions (last visited May 1, 2015).
116 At least metaphorically intended.
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intents. A company chef (?1) may intend “medium heat” to mean 325°F (the temper-
ature needed to produce optimal quality soup), but Campbell’s head of marketing
(?2) may intend “medium heat” to mean 374°F (the temperature needed to cook the
soup fast enough to compete with other quick-prep meals on the market).
The idea that individuals within the group defer to the expertise and intended
meanings of ? can supplement both the simple and complex summative accounts of
collective intentionality. If ? intends X, and a majority of group members defers to the
intended meaning of ?, then a majority of group members intends X. This is enough
to satisfy the simple summative account.117 The only caveats that the complex sum-
mative account adds is (1) ?’s intended meaning must be common knowledge to the
group, and (2) it must be common knowledge in the group that a majority of individ-
uals deferred to ?’s intended meaning.118 That judges look to ?’s intended meaning
as evidence of a group’s intended meaning may already be prevalent in legal interpre-
tation. Judges are often called to discern the intent of corporate parties to contracts.119
5. Listeners Often Resort to Public Meaning to Make Sense of Group
Communications When Metaphorical Intent Is Difficult to Ascertain
We likely rely on public meaning more often than intended meaning in the
context of group communications because of the high information costs involved.
When bypassing120 occurs between two individuals, the listener can often resolve am-
biguities in the speaker’s words by asking, “What do you mean?”121 In the context
of group communications, however, the listener cannot simply consult any member
of the group for an accurate representation of the group’s meaning. The Campbell’s
delivery driver may be available for comment on the meaning of “medium heat,” but
her idea of the intended meaning may be no more reliable of the company’s intended
meaning than any off-the-shelf cookbook. The same would apply to Campbell’s
customer service representative (unless she has a specific answer at the ready from
117 Group A intends X, if and only if most of Group A’s members intend X. See Tollefsen,
supra note 98 (Tollefsen presents the formula in a slightly different manner: “Group G believes
that p if and only if all or most of the members believe that p.”).
118 Group A intends X, if and only if most of Group A’s members intend X, and it is common
knowledge that most of the members intend X. See id. (Tollefsen’s formulation: “A group G
believes that p if and only if (1) most of the members of G believe that p, and (2) it is common
knowledge in G that (1).”).
119 See, e.g., In re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. 51, 74 (1865) (discussing contact between
government and corporation: “All contracts are to be construed to accomplish the intention
of the parties . . . .”). Indeed, unless a single-actor-agent (recall, intent can only exist at the
individual level) bound a corporation to the terms of an agreement, corporations could never
form the intent necessary to achieve mutual assent under the common law of contracting.
120 For an explanation of “bypassing,” see supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
121 Due to the “collaborative nature of conversation,” speakers can also detect and correct
errors made by their conversational counterparts. See Keysar et al., supra note 84, at 37.
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a Company Chef). So instead of going through the process of trying to get at the heart
of what the company meant by a certain word or phrase, we simply rely on either our
own understanding of the words or we consult a cookbook, which is likely to be in-
dicative of the public understanding of the words.122 We are able to take these short-
cuts because we go about our daily lives with the understanding that in most settings
communications are made deliberately—they are designed to be understood without
a complex inquiry into the speaker’s intent.123 That we sometimes approach the inter-
pretative exercise from an egocentric perspective is demonstrated in the abovemen-
tioned candle test.124 Indeed the study’s authors suggest that we employ an egocentric
strategy because we are making a cost benefit analysis.125 And with group communi-
cations, the cost of uncovering intent is particularly high.
C. How Principles of Communication Should Inform Original
Meaning Jurisprudence
Intent only exists within individual minds; groups cannot form intents.126 The
simple summative account of group communications says that if a majority of indi-
viduals within the group intends to mean X, then the group (metaphorically speak-
ing) intends to mean X;127 the complex summative account further requires that the
majority’s intended meaning be common knowledge among the members of the
group.128 However, the information costs involved with accurately obtaining the intents
of each member of the group are insurmountable. So we, as listeners, approach the
interpretive calculus heuristically in at least two ways: we rely on the ordinary public
122 That we occasionally rely on our own understanding rather than searching for the
speaker’s intent is demonstrated in Taking Perspective in Conversation: The Role of Mutual
Knowledge in Comprehension. See supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. Even when we
know that the author is communicating from a different perspective, we occasionally still ad-
here to egocentric methods of interpretations, perhaps heuristically because we assume that the
author has communicated in a way that is understandable without an inquiry into authorial in-
tent. See infra note 125 and accompanying text; see also supra note 43.
123 See Krauss & Fussell, supra note 43, at 3 (“Messages are formulated to be understood by
a specific audience, and in order to be comprehensible they must take into account what that
audience does and does not know.”); see also Federalist Society Panel on Robert Bork, supra
note 30 (“[P]eople use words to convey meaning and they know that other people are likely
to take the ordinary meaning as the meaning that they intended.”) (statement by Professor
Saikrishna Prakash, 1:20:05 through 1:22:11).
124 See supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text.
125 See Keysar et al., supra note 84, at 37 (“[An egocentric strategy] might require minimal
cognitive effort because it uses accessible information and does not take into account alternative
perspectives, which might involve further mental computation.”).
126 See Tollefsen, supra note 98 (“The dominant picture in [Anglo-American and European
philosophical circles] is that intentionality is a feature of individual minds/brains.”).
127 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (simple summative formula).
128 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (complex summative formula).
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meaning of the communication,129 or we look to the intent of ?130 (or multiple ?s)
within the group as evidence of the intent of others.131
In the judicial setting, either approach likely will get us close to the actual meaning
of the legal text, but relying on the intent of ? respects the notion that it is within the
providence of the legislature to make law, and that the intended meanings of legisla-
tors matter. Relying on these principles, original meaning judges should look for evi-
dence of an ? (or multiple ?s) within the group that formed the legal text. Recall, ?
would be a key figure involved in forming the legal text to whose meaning others
either actually deferred or to which they were likely132 to defer. If one accepts the
simple summative account, then any evidence of ?’s intended meaning could be uti-
lized, even if that intent was evidenced by information that was unknown to other mem-
bers of the legislature.133 If one subscribes to the complex summative account, then
?’s intended meanings could only be used by a judge if ?’s intended meaning was
common knowledge to the legislators.134 If ? is not discernible, or if there are multiple
?s that have disparate intended meanings for the same text, then the judge should
resort to the original public meaning, much the same way that we as listeners resort
to public meaning when the information cost of determining a group’s metaphorical
intent is too high.135
III. THEORY IN PRACTICE
The U.C.C. is an interesting subject for group-communication-based analysis.
The Code was not crafted by state legislatures, but is rather the product of a commit-
tee sponsored by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI).136 By October 1952, the 1952
Official Text and Comments Editions137 was published.138 Pennsylvania adopted the
129 This is the textualist’s approach.
130 Because intent can only exist at the level of the individual mind, intentionalism should
only search for intent at the individual level. Rather than consider the intended meaning of just
anyone in the group, we rely on the intent of ?, which is more likely to be representative of the
metaphorically intended meaning. By excluding evidence of non-?s, we reduce the interpreta-
tive gamble of relying on a single legislator, whose meaning may be idiosyncratic and foreign
to most legislators. ?, however, is, by its nature, likely to be representative of other legislators.
131 See supra Part II.B.4.
132 Evidence of actual reliance on ? within the group may be impossible to find, and the goal
is not perfection. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
133 For instance, a private letter written by ?.
134 In this scenario, a judge would likely need an official comments section (or something
analogous) that ? was instrumental in forming.
135 See supra Part II.B.5.
136 For a thorough retelling of the history of the Code, see generally Walter D. Malcolm, The
Uniform Commercial Code in the United States, 12 INTER. & COMP. L.Q. 226 (1963).
137 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (1952).
138 See Malcolm, supra note 136, at 230.
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Code the following year;139 however, the New York Legislature was hesitant to adopt
the 1952 version and formed the Law Revision Commission to study whether a revi-
sion would be necessary.140 New York’s Law Revision Commission worked with the
NCCUSL and the ALI,141 culminating in a revised version in 1958.142 By 1967, all
states (with the exception of Louisiana143) had adopted the Code.144
The question that arises for the intentionalist is which group’s intended meaning
is more dispositive of the actual meaning of a given Code provision? State legisla-
tures (at least some) did not merely accept the text as promulgated by the sponsoring
organizations—as evidenced by New York’s careful examination and rejection of
the 1952 version of the Code.145 In that sense, the intended meanings of legislatures
may be relevant to the inquiry. But there may be good reason to look to the meanings
of the sponsoring organizations rather than each legislature that ratified the Code.
William Twining offers three justifications for consulting the Official Comments
promulgated by the sponsoring organizations:
[T]hey bear the imprimatur of those responsible for the Code and
so they have strong claims to be authoritative; they were prepared
concurrently with the drafting of the Code, and so are not vulner-
able to any suggestion of hindsight or second thoughts; they are,
above all, accessible and easy to use.146
In addition to the reasons offered by Twining, the purpose of a uniform code is to have
uniform law throughout the states.147 State legislatures have adopted the text with the
knowledge that they are ratifying the same law (with the same meaning) as sister states.
139 See id. at 230; see also MARION W. BENFIELD, JR. & MICHAEL W. GREENFIELD, SALES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (6th ed. 2011); WILLIAM TWINING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS
38 (1968).
140 See Malcolm, supra note 136, at 230–31.
141 Id. at 230–33.
142 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (1958).
143 Louisiana ultimately “adopted all Articles of the Code except Articles 2 and 2A.”
BENFIELD & GREENFIELD, supra note 139, at 5.
144 See id.
145 See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
146 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 329 (2012).
147 There is a sense among judges that they should defer to the interpretation of a majority
of jurisdictions, even when they believe that a better interpretation is available. See BENFIELD
& GREENFIELD, supra note 139, at 9 (noting that judges should “rely . . . on the decisions of
other code states” and “give their own decisions somewhat less permanent precedential value”).
This Note does not adopt the above position, because the focus of original meaning jurispru-
dence should be to ascertain the correct meaning, not the popular one. But insofar as this trend
of judges deferring to the decisions of other legislatures is an acknowledgment that the law that
has come into existence has uniform meaning throughout the states, this Note is somewhat
sympathetic to their actions.
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In seeking the intended meaning of the sponsoring organizations’ committee
(hereinafter, the Committee), the intentionalist must first acknowledge that individual
members of the Committee certainly intended different meanings for the same text.
However, because the information costs of obtaining the intended meanings of each
member of the group is insurmountable, and because we are looking only for a meta-
phorical intent, we look for the intended meaning of ? within the group as evidence
of the metaphorical intent. If ? was among the drafters of the Code, it was likely Karl
Llewellyn. Commentators go so far as to call the Code “Llewellyn’s Code,”148 “Lex
Llewellyn,”149 and “Llewellyn’s Llaw.”150 William Twining describes Llewellyn’s
involvement in drafting the Code: “[T]he general style of drafting and the central
concepts of the code, as well as many of the particular solutions of problems of sub-
stance, style, and wording, are Llewellyn’s.”151 Twining goes on to discuss the close-
knit nature of the drafting process:
Each article was originally given to one or two draftsmen, who
were usually professors of law, and an advisory group of six, most
of whom were practitioners or judges. The draftsmen prepared
the initial drafts; these were revised in consultation with Llewellyn
and the Assistant Chief Reporter, Soia Mentschikoff, and then
reviewed and corrected in detail by the advisers.152
In addition, Professor Llewellyn was involved heavily in drafting the early Official
Comments for Article 2.153 In short, Llewellyn is a key figure in the group, and others
within the group likely would have deferred to his expertise. Llewellyn’s intended
meaning is perhaps the sort of evidence on which an intentionalist would rely. Recall,
that the goal of judicial interpretation is not perfection,154 but rather to get as close as
possible. Reliance on one member of the group will not always be indicative of law’s
148 Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).
149 Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 330 (1951).
150 Peter A. Alces, Symposium: The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Introduction, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1994).
151 TWINING, supra note 146, at 36; see also Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2
Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1146–47 n.25 (1985) (noting Llewellyn’s involvement
in Article 2).
152 TWINING, supra note 146, at 37.
153 Id. at 328 (“Llewellyn and Mentschikoff expended an enormous amount of time on the
first drafts of the Sales Comments during the period 1943–5.”).
154 See BORK, supra note 5, at 163 (“We must not expect too much of the search for original
understanding in any legal context. The result of the search is never perfection; it is simply the
best we can do; and the best we can do must be regarded as good enough—or we must abandon
the enterprise of law and, most especially, that of judicial review.”).
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existential element, just as reliance on an objectified public meaning will not always
be indicative of law’s existential element. However, by relying on ? (Llewellyn) we
reduce this risk by focusing on a key figure within the group whose intended meaning
others were likely to defer to.
A. Interpreting Article 2 of the U.C.C.
Before discussing any interpretive approach related to the U.C.C., it is important
to note that the Code seems to thrust upon judges its own Code-mandated interpretive
methods.155 One provision of the Code seems to impose a form of purposivism.156
Another provision, removed in 1956,157 seemed to be more (at least a little more) sym-
pathetic to the textualist cause.158 Whether a legislature can impose such a mandate
on the judiciary is a question that far exceeds the bounds of this paper. Although it is
an interesting question, the proposition seems at least questionable.159 This Note will
approach the interpretive calculus using the methods discussed herein, and not rely
on any interpretive method espoused by the Code itself.
The first thing that should be noted about the Official Comments is that they are
not contained in the legal text adopted by the states.160 The Official Comments are
not even “official” insofar as “they have been formally adopted neither by the floors
of the sponsoring bodies nor by legislatures which have enacted the Code.”161 Indeed,
in some circumstances the Comments were not provided to legislators considering
the Code for adoption,162 although presumably there were at least some legislators who
155 See U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2013).
156 See id. (“[The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies . . . .”). Before the revision of Article 1, this pro-
vision was found, in slightly different language, in U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1958) (“This Act shall
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.”).
157 See TWINING, supra note 146, at 327–28. Interestingly, while the provision specifically
required that text win out over comment when the two conflict, New York’s Law Revision
Commission objected because “the provision allowing the reference to the Comments gave
them undue weight.” Id. at 328.
158 See U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(f) (1952) (“The Comments of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted in
the construction and application of this Act but if text and comment conflict, text controls . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
159 The power to interpret law is held by the Judiciary branch. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 1
(“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
160 See Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. v. Neal A. Sweebe, Inc., 837 N.W.2d 244, 254 (Mich.
2013) (“The official comments to the UCC do not have the force of law.” (citation omitted)).
161 TWINING, supra note 146, at 326.
162 Id.
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had access to the Comments.163 Employing principles of group communication, the
intentionalist would not rely on the Comments as legal text—the legal text is limited
to the language adopted by the state legislatures. The Comments are, however, per-
haps a window into the intended meanings of Karl Llewellyn, an ? within the group
that formed the communication.
B. The Meaning of “Merchant” Under a Textualist and Intentionalist Analysis
A party’s status as “merchant” is of paramount importance when applying
Article 2 of the U.C.C. Among other things, merchant status is critical for determin-
ing whether a firm offer has been made,164 whether a written confirmation satisfies
the statute of frauds,165 whether additional terms in a written confirmation become
part of the contract,166 whether the contract includes implied warranties,167 and whether
a party has reasonable grounds for requesting adequate assurance.168
In determining what is meant by the term “merchant,” the first step is to proceed
to Article 2’s definitions section. Section 2-104(1) is the apposite legal text:
“Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
163 The Official Comments are included with the text in the literature promulgated by the ALI
and NCCUSL. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS
(1959) (each Code provision is immediately followed by the Official Comments for that section).
164 See U.C.C. § 2-205 (2012) (“An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed
writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack
of consideration . . . .”). Presumably, a firm offer by a non-merchant must be supported by
consideration.
165 See U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2012) (“Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the [statute of frauds] against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it
is received.”).
166 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2012) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received.”).
167 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012) (“[A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”).
168 See U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (2012) (“Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to com-
mercial standards.”).
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who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowl-
edge or skill.169
There then seem to be at least five separate paths to the status of merchant: (1) a per-
son who deals in goods of the kind; (2) a person who by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the business practices; (3) a person who
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods;
(4) a person who employs an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the business practices;
(5) a person who employs an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods.
Relying on the text of Section 2-104(1) alone, it appears that “merchant” should
have a universal meaning throughout Article 2 because it is centrally defined in the
legal text. But was “merchant” intended to mean the same thing across Code provi-
sions? Both textualist and intentionalist analyses would conclude that “merchant”
in fact means different things in different provisions, but intentionalism will reveal
some subtleties that will be lost in the textualist analysis.
Relying on Section 2-104(1) in a vacuum, one would anticipate that there would
be no distinction between the merchant who has knowledge and skill in business prac-
tices and the merchant who has knowledge and skill in goods. Both merchants would
fall under the central definition of the term.170 However, some Code provisions
qualify the term.171 For example, Section 2-314 only applies “if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of [the] kind,”172 and Section 2-403(2) applies to “a merchant
who deals in goods of [the] kind.”173 Clearly then, “a person who . . . by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices,”174 would
not be a merchant under Sections 2-314 and 2-403(2), unless that person also “deals
in goods of [the] kind”175 or “is a merchant with respect to goods of [the] kind.”176
Most Article 2 provisions containing “merchant,” however, do not further qualify
the term.177 In those provisions, would there be any distinction between merchants
169 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS § 2-104(1) (1959).
170 See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2012).
171 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012); U.C.C. § 2-403 (2012).
172 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2012) (implied warranty of merchantability).
173 U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012) (entrusting).
174 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS § 2-104(1) (1959).
175 U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012).
176 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2012).
177 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2012) (statute of frauds); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2012) (firm
offers); U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2012) (battle of the forms); U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (2012) (modifica-
tion, rescission); U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (2012) (risk of loss); U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (2012) (right to
adequate assurance); U.C.C. § 2-605(1)(b) (2012) (waiver of buyer’s objections by failure
to particularize).
1242 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:1215
skilled in business practices and merchants skilled in goods? Under a textualist
analysis, it does not appear so. Either type of merchant falls under the umbrella of the
central definition of the term178 and would be implicated wherever the term is used
without further qualification. The problem with the textualist analysis, in this par-
ticular case, is that the Official Comments contradict the seemingly clear conclusion
that merchants who have specialized knowledge or skill in business practices are
meant to be treated identically to merchants who have specialized knowledge or skill
in the goods.179 Because this Note endorses an intention-based analysis when the
intended meaning of ? is available, and because Llewellyn’s intended meanings are
represented in the Official Comments, the Note will proceed with an examination
of the Comments.
Because intentionalism is concerned with original intended meaning (what
Llewellyn as ? originally intended a provision to mean), an examination of any
changes to the legal text or Comments over the years is first needed. If the Comments
have changed after state legislatures adopted the Code, we would need to resort to
historical versions. The sponsoring organizations published several drafts of the Code
before it was adopted.180 A 1949 draft of the Code181 contained a slightly different ver-
sion of our modern Section 2-104(1).182 In addition, the 1949 Comments for that pro-
vision were considerably different than later drafts.183 Interestingly, in the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: 1952 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS184 the legal text of § 2-
104(1) was changed into its current iteration, but the Comments for Section 2-104
were unchanged from the 1949 draft.185 Essentially, the old 1949 Comments were
178 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS § 2-104(1) (1959).
179 See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2012) (distinguishing between “goods” and “practices”
merchants).
180 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT (1949); UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (1952); UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE: 1952 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS: WITH CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS
APPROVED BY THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD AT MEETINGS HELD ON DECEMBER 29,
1952, FEBRUARY 16, 1953, MAY 21, 1953, AND DECEMBER 11, 1953 (1953), reprinted in
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, vol. XVI (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984); UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (1959).
181 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT (1949).
182 See Hillinger, supra note 151, at 1143 (1985) (“When enacted, Article 2 contained . . .
a merchant definition very similar to the one proposed by Llewellyn in 1949.”). Compare UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT § 2-104(1) (1949), with U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2012).
183 Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT § 2-104 cmt. 1, 2, 3 (1949),
with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS § 2-104 cmt. 1,
2, 3 (1959).
184 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (1952).
185 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT § 2-104(1) (1949); id. at cmt. 1,
2, 3; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (1952)
§ 2-104(1); id. at cmt. 1, 2, 3.
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supplementing the new 1952 legal text. This hiccup was quickly remedied when an
alternate 1952 version186 modified the Comments section to reflect the changes to
§ 2-104(1).
The fact that the legal text of § 2-104 has been supplemented by two different
Comment sections would be cause for concern for the intentionalist who may con-
clude that no reliable evidence of intended meaning can be found in disparate explana-
tions for the same text. If so, the intentionalist would resort to a textualist analysis as
a second-best solution.187 One explanation for the varied Comment sections, however,
is that the Section was rewritten piecemeal: the sponsoring organizations redrafted the
legal text in the initial 1952 version188 and updated the Comment section in the revised
1952 draft.189 This explanation would perhaps be plausible enough for the intention-
alist to rely on the later 1952 Comments as evidence of the intended meaning.190
The changes reflected in the later 1952 version191 are identical to § 2-104 of the
1958 version adopted by the states.192 Section 2-104 Comment 2 states:
The professional status under the definition may be based upon
specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge
as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and
186 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1952 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS: WITH CHANGES
AND MODIFICATIONS APPROVED BY THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD AT MEETINGS HELD
ON DECEMBER 29, 1952, FEBRUARY 16, 1953, MAY 21, 1953, AND DECEMBER 11, 1953 § 2-104
(1953), reprinted in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, vol. XVI (Elizabeth Slusser
Kelly ed., 1984).
187 See supra Part II.C.
188 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION § 2-104
(1952).
189 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1952 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS: WITH CHANGES
AND MODIFICATIONS APPROVED BY THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD AT MEETINGS HELD ON
DECEMBER 29, 1952, FEBRUARY 16, 1953, MAY 21, 1953, AND DECEMBER 11, 1953 (1953), re-
printed in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, vol. XVI (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984).
190 Another problem presents itself here for the intentionalist. It is not clear whether, or to
what extent, Llewellyn was involved in the redrafted Comment to § 2-104. It is certain that
Llewellyn was heavily involved in drafting the 1949 legal text, which is very similar to modern
§ 2-104. See Hillinger, supra note 151, at 1143 (“When enacted, Article 2 contained . . . a mer-
chant definition very similar to the one proposed by Llewellyn in 1949.”). As discussed above,
the Comment accompanying Llewellyn’s 1949 version is significantly different than the Com-
ment accompanying subsequent versions of § 2-104. It is possible that the Comment accom-
panying modern § 2-104 is not Llewellyn’s work at all—problematic for an intentionalist
relying on Llewellyn as ?.
191 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1952 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS: WITH CHANGES
AND MODIFICATIONS APPROVED BY THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD AT MEETINGS HELD ON
DECEMBER 29, 1952, FEBRUARY 16, 1953, MAY 21, 1953, AND DECEMBER 11, 1953 (1953), re-
printed in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, vol. XVI (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984).
192 Compare id. at § 2-104 cmt. 1, 2, 3, with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL
TEXT WITH COMMENTS, § 2-104 cmt. 1, 2, 3 (1959).
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which kind of specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish
the merchant status is indicated by the nature of the provisions.193
The Comment makes it clear that some Article 2 provisions were intended to apply
only to goods merchants, only to practices merchants, or to all of the above.194 Which
type of merchant is intended by the given provision “is indicated by the nature of the
provisions.”195 The distinction between goods and practices merchants has led to con-
fusion in the courts.196 A more detailed definition of goods and practices merchants
is necessary before proceeding.
“Practices merchants” is a broad category encompassing nearly every person in
the business world. Comment 2 provides that “[f]or purposes of [the sections covering
practices merchants] almost every person in business would . . . be deemed to be a
‘merchant’ . . . since the practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized
business practices such as answering mail.”197 In contrast, “goods merchants” is “a
much smaller group than everyone who is engaged in business and requires a profes-
sional status as to particular kinds of goods.”198 The Comments go on to specify
which provisions are intended to apply to “goods merchants” (§§ 2-314, 2-402(2),
and 2-403(2)), “practices merchants” (§§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209), and
either practices or goods merchants (§§ 2-327(1)(c), 2-603, 2-605, 2-509, and 2-609).199
As discussed above, some Code provisions explicitly require some familiarity
in the transacted goods.200 In those cases, textualism and intentionalism will carry one
to the same conclusion: a goods merchant is required for these provisions. No Code
provision, however, explicitly qualifies the term merchant to mean only a practices
merchant. Here is where the intentionalist and textualist analyses part ways. The tex-
tualist would conclude—in interpreting § 2-201(2), for example—that “merchant”
encompasses all practices merchants, and all goods merchants. However, the inten-
tionalist, in consulting Llewellyn’s intended meaning, would conclude that “merchant”
in Section 2-201(2) means only “practices merchant.”201 A seller familiar with goods,
but not versed in business practices, would not fall under the scope of the provision.202
193 U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
194 Recall that “merchant” would have a universal meaning throughout the Code under a
textualist analysis.
195 U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 2 (2012).
196 Hillinger, supra note 151, at 1146 n.22.
197 U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 2 (2012).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2012); U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012).
201 To illustrate, Professor Ingrid Hillinger notes that although a small “apple farmer who
marketed three to six hundred bushels a year” would qualify as a goods merchant, he would not
be a practices merchant. See Hillinger, supra note 151, at 1177. As a result, he would not be
considered a merchant for purposes of the statute of frauds. See id. (“The evidence indicates
Llewellyn did not consider most farmers to be merchants for purposes of the statute of frauds.”).
202 See id.
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C. When the Interpretive Calculus Will Not Work
The advantage of applying one’s own methodology is the ability to be selective
in your application of it. However, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson has suggested that the
true test of an interpretive method’s viability is not the easy cases, but the hard ones.203
In that respect, I am afraid, the preceding application may be lacking. This Note delib-
erately examines a source of law where the described methodology is more likely to
work—Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In demonstrating the application
of the methodology, the purpose is not to show that intentionalism—informed by
principles of group communications—will work in every scenario. It most certainly
will not. However, because the normative goal of judicial interpretation is to discover
law’s existential element, the interpretative method that gets us closest to that under-
lying source of legal liability should be employed. In certain cases, intentionalism is
that method.
While the preceding Part consults the Code’s Official Comments, it is clear that
comments, no matter how official, will not necessarily be indicative of the legislature’s
intended meaning. Article 2’s Official Comments were useful not because they were
published by the sponsoring organizations alongside the text, but because they con-
veyed an intended meaning of an ? within the group. This Note is sympathetic to
Justice Scalia’s criticism of reliance on committee hearings.204 Justice Scalia and
Bryan Garner write of whole industries created for the sole purpose of creating leg-
islative history: “Anyone familiar with the congressional scene knows that one of
the regular jobs of Washington law firms is to draft legislative history—to be read
on the floor or inserted into committee reports.”205 It seems that legislative history,
strategically created to achieve a desired result, would not be indicative of an in-
tended meaning. However, committees heavily involved in crafting a bill will per-
haps contain ?s whose intended meanings are indicative of a metaphorical intent.
The difficulty is in separating the wheat from the chaff—and this is, to be sure, prob-
lematic for the interpreter. When the evidence is not likely to reveal a metaphorical
intent, we resort to textualism—which may be what we do anyway when interpret-
ing group communications.206
Of course, a host of questions arise concerning the applicability of the methodology
discussed herein. At the margins, how do we determine who is ?? How can we know
whether members of the legislature were likely to rely on ?’s intended meanings?
203 See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF GOVERNMENT 72–73 (2012) (“[E]asy cases have
a tremendous ability to deceive. When confronted with more complicated cases, process theory
begins to crumble.”).
204 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 376–77.
205 Id. at 377; see also id. (“Legislators engage in floor colloquies (again, typically before
an empty house) precisely to induce courts to accept their views about how a statute works.”).
206 See supra Part II.B.5.
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What sort of relationship must ? have with the relied upon evidence? Must ? be the
author of the evidence? Or is ?’s endorsement of the evidence enough? Should we rely
on the simple or rather the complex summative account of group communications?
The answers are that there are no answers, yet. Perhaps the solution is that it must be
left up to the judge’s judgment to answer these questions, but this lacks the sort of
rigorousness needed to achieve unbiased decisionmaking. If a judge is bent on biased
decision-making, there is a bevy of interpretive methods more conducive to judicial
bias than a form of intentionalism that relies on the same methods we use to interpret
group communications everyday.
CONCLUSION
Treating legal texts as communications poses certain challenges, principally the
lack of collective intent—individuals within a legislature almost certainly intend dif-
ferent meanings for the same legal texts.207 However, legal texts may be no different
than any other group communication, and we manage to make sense of group com-
munications in a variety of ways, despite the problem of collective intentionality.
Principles of group communication help us overcome this problem of collective
intentionality by providing that (1) meaning is set by the group communicating the
message;208 (2) while groups cannot form intents, attributing a metaphorical intent
to groups is useful for determining the meaning of group communications;209 (3) we
can derive metaphorical intent through simple and complex summative accounts of
group speech;210 (4) individuals within the group often form their intent by relying
on the expertise and intended meanings of others in the group;211 and (5) for practical
reasons, listeners often do resort to public meaning to make sense of group commu-
nications when metaphorical intent is too difficult to ascertain.212
Intent only exists within individual minds; groups cannot form intents.213 The
simple summative account of group communications says that if a majority of indi-
viduals within the group intends to mean X, then the group (metaphorically speaking)
intends to mean X;214 the complex summative account further requires that the ma-
jority’s intended meaning be common knowledge among the members of the group.215
However, the information costs involved with accurately obtaining the intents of each
207 See supra Part II.A.
208 See supra Part II.B.1.
209 See supra Part II.B.2.
210 See supra Part II.B.3.
211 See supra Part II.B.4.
212 See supra Part II.B.5.
213 See Tollefsen, supra note 98 (“The dominant picture in [Anglo-American and European
philosophical] circles is that intentionality is a feature of individual minds/brains.”).
214 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (simple summative formula).
215 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (complex summative formula).
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member of the group are insurmountable. As listeners, we approach the interpretive
calculus heuristically in at least two ways: we rely on the ordinary public meaning of
the communication, or we look to the intent of ?216 (or multiple ?s) within the group
as evidence of the intent of others.217
In the judicial setting, either approach likely will get us close to the actual meaning
of the legal text, but relying on the intent of ? respects the notion that it is within the
providence of the legislature to make law, and the intended meanings of legislators
matter. Relying on these principles, original meaning judges should look for evidence
of an ? (or multiple ?s) within the group that formed the legal text. Recall, ? would
be a key figure involved in forming the legal text whose meaning others either actually
deferred to, or were likely218 to defer to. If one accepts the simple summative account,
then any evidence of ?’s intended meaning could be utilized, even if that intent was
evidenced by information that was unknown to other members of the legislature. If
one subscribes to the complex summative account, then ?’s intended meanings could
only be used by a judge if ?’s intended meaning was common knowledge to the leg-
islators. If ? is not discernible, or if there are multiple ?s that have disparate intended
meanings for the same text, then the judge should resort to the original public mean-
ing, much the same way that we as listeners resort to public meaning when the infor-
mation cost of determining a group’s metaphorical intent is too high.219
To be certain, the intentionalist calculus will not always work, and in those cases
textualism should supplant intentionalism. When we can make the calculus work,
when we can discern a metaphorical intent in the same way that we find a metaphor-
ical intent in all other group communications, original meaning jurisprudence should
embrace principles of group communication. Let us not throw our hands in the air.
216 Because intent can only exist at the level of the individual mind, intentionalism should
only search for intent at the individual level. Rather than consider the intended meaning of just
anyone in the group, we rely on the intent of ?, which is more likely to be representative of the
actual meaning. By excluding evidence of non-?s, we reduce the interpretative gamble of rely-
ing on a single legislator, whose meaning may be idiosyncratic and foreign to most legislators.
However, ? is likely to be representative of other legislators.
217 See supra Part II.B.4.
218 Evidence of actual reliance on ? within the group may be impossible to find.
219 See supra Part II.B.5.

